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      標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪 [打印本頁(yè)]

      作者: 雜七雜八    時(shí)間: 2011-1-12 21:01
      標(biāo)題: NT的密碼究竟放在哪
      根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡(jiǎn)單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
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      # a  _0 P; B# n0 j" C% vFrom: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>5 F6 k$ u5 @4 [" T$ g7 B' W

      8 S5 f$ a0 U# ?To: sans@clark.net$ J9 [7 B) S8 V+ {5 j+ `
      Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords9 X8 }' r: T; w( {
      Hi all,1 x  v, a2 [; L! J) o7 |$ ^! V* q; O) z
      We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across  N2 P: [* V: P
      the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
      / x8 _+ E/ R. }' f2 L/ XIIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
      - q: b0 \7 z: E; h8 J. k; Z( b$ xbe compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,6 O  y+ Q1 a: A, R
      Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
      + L4 c" o# W9 FC:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
      4 F' m6 y7 b' \0 w0 SThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:1 r9 I) ~% f9 Y3 V1 u
      - IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the* D6 z4 K8 Z6 ?. C
      MMC)9 r8 H8 _  A' v4 H, ~# h
      - IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
      , v$ j, `% q5 C- G3 L( y- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of! k, y# p- A$ f% Y, q- v( l* b
      your virtual directories is located there.
      ( @; b/ T: i$ x) K9 N3 V* B% u; ^- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
      # m% |" y1 H7 t/ e& z- g( e0 r& u"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).( ]4 l& E9 |2 j/ I0 ~/ T" J& B
      Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
        Q0 z, q0 D  g" t; vsrambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM$ @6 e1 M2 d% n1 G5 D
      have permissions on this file.0 k7 n0 m/ D! |8 R9 h
      BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
      4 C- s. w3 q7 ?) Tthese passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
      + ^/ B4 c# |& [% d2 {, V0 uThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a
      ! \2 m9 g: W- {& A& y) f" kmalicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.
      ( b. Q7 K& O4 ?Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow1 N, n2 }# |( u+ F3 S* d& p' |0 o+ t
      logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
      6 _8 m2 z7 \4 j/ o( {' Vproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:% r4 x( g5 ^4 F7 i1 u  _+ o6 @6 q6 o: I! m
      "" B# m/ \8 v8 }6 z3 |8 ?
      IIS 4.0 Metabase
      0 x' P/ G* h5 A8 |( W?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
      - V& \0 D2 m- l--- UNC User ---
      : h& n; \3 u, `% i) D: A4 W  H# {2 G3 zUNC User name: 'Lou'7 @- v, c# \" e0 O5 _% R2 `
      UNC User password: 'Microsoft'1 ?9 ]- b. C& V/ b/ p1 u. `
      UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False': Q5 @3 C3 F( c6 R
      --- Anonymous User ---/ r1 c/ S2 a1 L4 R# R
      Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER', p8 e& E3 B4 V0 X8 [3 _7 s6 D
      Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'- f$ i" Z& n: k! H
      Password synchronization: 'False'$ x6 E6 d# j& X6 Q
      --- IIS Logs DSN User ---
      5 D8 _/ V2 O9 e+ x+ x( XODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'  e" j9 e5 `' @- M
      ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'8 O6 x5 J" a! _4 w! T
      ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
      % ~4 Y1 s. ^4 UODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'- z; \. v- ], G  V9 }' q
      --- Web Applications User ---7 ?! d+ S+ w) H# _0 @
      WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'  q. o3 @* `( e
      WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
      ' N1 G- `  w2 Y' WDefault Logon Domain: ''  e0 t+ Q0 U+ E, P: Y" O: a" \
      "
      # R8 Q4 w/ r  Z1 b+ FFor example, you can imagine the following scenario:" a3 t' Z, [0 j8 g! w  x
      A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say  W7 i9 K& P0 o6 `
      server (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
      4 I: f7 S' Z, d7 c! k0 o7 Wan IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts+ O7 O  r# h* u
      the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual' u4 }+ l# Z; @( t* d
      directory located on another server, say (b).. Q+ y6 d6 p1 o5 O. V
      Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).: v+ L2 e5 k7 ]# E( @
      And so forth...
      * a1 A( Q1 b) P+ X4 DMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.# G6 t9 U8 Z7 f7 {. X, l
      _______________________________________________________________________
      ( t. H( f" i) j; Q+ h. mPatrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
        u; k' I( ~; X+ @( P0 w. xMCP NT 4.0
      + C4 X  a6 @8 Z$ p/ c. jInternet, Security and Microsoft solutions
      0 f7 ^2 U8 E3 E- Qe-business Services
      - w" s2 I: L  N. e7 BIBM Global Services
      $ K2 P5 h9 i$ C: S% y# J9 M9 z; X) @




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