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      NT的密碼究竟放在哪

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      發(fā)表于 2011-1-12 21:01:17 | 只看該作者 |倒序瀏覽 |閱讀模式
      根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
      / _/ D/ l7 [' [+ `6 z. H9 H8 f' J7 H5 Z: T/ _1 T! }& Q5 B5 p# F
      From: Patrick CHAMBET <[email protected]>
      0 P5 W3 X# Q8 ?  I  V' J9 F9 Q% l* J5 i1 {' f
      To: [email protected]7 |9 g$ m* H1 w% d3 w
      Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
      " X8 ]0 b& j. Y% L$ J6 f3 QHi all,9 e, L$ u4 d5 @' O
      We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across- F! d$ q# M1 x5 U3 D( O  P
      the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
      - B/ B4 y+ T+ T! l/ ^IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can) q; B& Q* h3 l5 Z9 z3 S) B! E
      be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
      * Q; I+ O( t) E- q  sKeys and Values. It is stored in the following file:& [8 w- n, E5 @# [
      C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
      5 L" y" g6 E' g* q* u  bThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
      . Z) k( R* N% y/ k! t6 E- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the" U" {' ~' x3 b% z; x
      MMC)% }8 [+ w7 f4 P6 l: ?) E
      - IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
      3 q" s# g+ w4 [& |% }" l9 Y- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of
      - ?7 ^1 |- y  Y$ G2 y) O. M( b. nyour virtual directories is located there.1 F' T$ a3 a2 T4 D
      - The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
      9 k3 g) e, H4 z4 v& z! f"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
      0 K% {2 d1 X! q; L# t0 Z/ F2 GNote that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
      3 ^% \4 E- P' n! _2 p& l, v% H  v1 Bsrambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM1 l5 f/ E/ ?' ^9 a
      have permissions on this file.: }# {# d& n0 |0 B4 T9 U" q' D- H  r
      BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
      9 F3 I: L. n) W# U! u$ H! fthese passwords in CLEAR TEXT., b! d# Z/ p0 S8 N# G) Y" w# n
      The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a* R: _# g0 D( z& E
      malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.4 o0 [" ~) Z! ^: t2 L% C. B# z+ e2 g
      Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow* d' S: z" @/ q; P7 i  J
      logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
      - }6 M+ h& m# qproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
      2 d3 M8 F* g- v! Q; j( U"  [5 x* h0 j& N1 A- v5 G
      IIS 4.0 Metabase
      9 r7 u- k6 w  v5 _. I% K  p3 p* V: m0 W?Patrick Chambet 1998 - [email protected]+ ]" e- D5 t  b# z
      --- UNC User ---
      1 F9 E5 e! X, v$ p) u- qUNC User name: 'Lou'
      + y9 M: @7 t# q% AUNC User password: 'Microsoft'/ |% A) Z$ ^5 O: U0 {
      UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'8 p6 _( q2 `, {
      --- Anonymous User ---
      9 A$ X0 S% n- }6 h( I9 XAnonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
      ) t9 m5 [; `; Z( v2 i2 ]Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
        U0 ?, f: d: o. b, `7 g5 xPassword synchronization: 'False'" f' g5 P4 f- V1 b+ W* [
      --- IIS Logs DSN User ---
      & \, _9 P! F- b' g3 fODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'  J8 d5 l* g3 @, `, n2 U% [
      ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'. Q* x& l4 D3 @/ `8 ^' E
      ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
      * _1 R- a+ Z9 i2 {3 VODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'* n' I* m% s  X( [. F8 F  v
      --- Web Applications User ---. C" G* i$ u0 O8 W( e2 N! z+ X
      WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
      7 m$ c0 D2 N- g% ~4 zWAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'4 J$ @( f1 W, N! x" `" g
      Default Logon Domain: ''! U, Q: Q5 l; P+ {
      "9 V" z: i, K* }! L  V( F
      For example, you can imagine the following scenario:- D0 e, q/ g6 U+ M& y
      A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
      8 l1 {! P, G" eserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
      4 k; d1 P9 @- J! T- J+ A( C" ian IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts' f" i3 L; a; x4 p, U' F
      the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
      0 M& W; L" ^5 p+ ~9 L  _  sdirectory located on another server, say (b).6 ~' C6 t9 ^4 |" {1 U8 q
      Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b)." m( u# n  D4 M' p
      And so forth...  |7 A- Z" x8 t: f
      Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability.
      9 `$ j$ j: O- M_______________________________________________________________________
      $ F: z) |$ z7 J  R* @Patrick CHAMBET - [email protected]
      % S3 Z  g9 e- y. R: J7 L# k( Z+ {MCP NT 4.0$ n; N  J5 I# y1 g1 E
      Internet, Security and Microsoft solutions
      / D( K/ }! n2 y1 d1 M4 u% z2 je-business Services5 Y0 `. ~, f$ i7 p# g
      IBM Global Services
      - }# |4 i8 i+ \9 E
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